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Institutions have often been characterised as responses to conflict, and assumptions about the 
nature of conflict have frequently determined the structure and scope of political activity. Two 
prevalent interpretations of conflictportray it as either a contest of interest ora competitionfor 
resources. Yet there is another view of conflict that regards it in terms of a contest of values, 
something that raises a different set of questions and issues. These issues involve concerns about 
the incommensurability and incompatibility of values, and challenge contemporary arguments 
that rely upon the ordering of preferences or that urge the pursuit of a normative consensus. 
A s  I  argue, both preference based theories and theories of deliberative democracy prove to deal 
inadequately with the challenges of moralpluralism and value conflict.
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In tro d u c tio n
The study of conflict has long been a concern for those interested in 
politics. Institutions have often been characterized as responses to conflict, 
and assumptions about the nature of conflict have frequently determined 
the structure and scope of political activity. Two prevalent interpretations of 
conflict portray it as either a contest of interest or a competition for resources. 
In each instance conflict is thought to entail a situation of instability that is to 
be overcome through the proper arrangement of political institutions. While 
such interpretations are instructive, they are not the only way to conceive 
conflict. For there is another conception of conflict tied to the idea of moral 
pluralism that provides a different account of how it arises. This account 
departs from conflict explained in terms o f interests or resources, and thereby 
prompts a reconsideration of how conflict can be understood and how it 
relates to institutions. Indeed, my argument is that moral pluralism involves a 
distinct form of conflict that not only defies attempts to address conflict in 
terms of preferences and their satisfaction, but also undercuts contemporary 
arguments about deliberative democracy. To show how this is so I will do the 
following.
First, I will review both conflicts of interest and conflicts over resources. 
As I will argue, conflicts of interest involve concerns about security, while 
conflicts over resources prompt consideration of the fair terms of cooperation. 
Although the two types of conflict are logically distinct they have been 
frequently conflated. This has led to a recent tendency to treat both concepts 
in terms of preferences, as it is believed that fostering the conditions that 
allow individuals to satisfy their preferences pre-empts conflict. Reviewing 
such arguments will help clarify the limits o f these conceptualizations of 
conflict, and thereby indicate why it is useful to consider the idea of conflict 
from the perspective of moral pluralism.
Second, I will review the constituent features of moral pluralism and consider 
how these features can lead to conflict. As I will argue, die incompatibility of values 
serves as the potential source of value conflict, while the incommensurability 
of values renders problematic, if not impossible, the sort of bargaining and 
deliberation that are found in much contemporary theory. Consequendy, because 
moral pluralism involves a set o f ideas that generate a unique type of conflict 
neither preference-based approaches nor theories of deliberative democracy 
adequately address the problems it poses.
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Two Concepts of Conflict
As mentioned, two particular conceptions o f conflict are notable in the 
context o f political theory, and while scholars have frequently regarded these 
concepts jointly it remains the case that they are analytically distinguishable. 
Hence it is necessary to differentiate them before reviewing how they are 
addressed by contemporary theorists.
The Conflict of Interest
Conflict understood in terms of the conflict o f interest involves what can 
be termed the “postulate of self-regard.” The postulate of self-regard holds 
that individuals are primarily concerned with their own interests, which is to 
say, that individuals are primarily egoistic. Hume, for instance, speaks of the 
individual’s “natural temper” which consists in “selfishness,” while Hobbes claims 
that the “voluntary acts of every man” aim at the “good to himself” (Hume, 
2006: 88; Hobbes, 1994, 82). The implication is that the individual’s interests take 
precedence over all else, as the individual’s self-concern determines what he ought 
to do. Individuals are not motivated by conceptions of the “good” or “duty,” but, 
instead, by personal experience. Such experience can be generated as a reaction 
to physical sensations, as Hobbes argues, or grounded upon the passions, as 
Hume holds (Hobbes, 1994, 6-7; Hume, 2006,13-4). Regardless, the result is that 
behavior is shaped by the individual’s response to subjective considerations.
There are several significant consequences of the postulate o f self-regard. 
The first is that the exclusive pursuit of personal ends generates a competitive 
attitude towards others. As Hobbes notes, “if any two men desire the same 
thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy” they will “endeavor to 
destroy or subdue one another” (Hobbes, 1994, 75). A second consequence 
is the instrumental character relationships assume, as individuals are regarded 
in terms of how they may help or hinder the pursuit of one’s own goals. And 
a final consequence is the inability to judge situations impartially, as one’s 
interests entail a biased appraisal o f one’s interaction with others. This particular 
consequence has been highlighted by Locke, who considers the want of an 
impartial “umpire” to exaggerate the natural tendency to judge in one’s own 
interests, and subsequendy treat others harsher than deserve (Locke, 1993, 273, 
351, 352; compare Hume, 2006, 90).
Two particular justifications for government can be distilled from these 
consequences. First, government exists to provide security. Because the self­
concern o f individuals promotes competition, which, in turn, serves as a
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basis for hostility, it becomes necessary to institute an authority which can, 
to paraphrase Hobbes, “overawe” all. Since our “natural passions...carry 
us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like” no individual can guarantee his 
own safety. Hence, it is necessary to authorize a “common power” which can 
ensure that individuals are “secure” from “the invasion of foreigners and the 
injuries of one another...” Government, then, exists to provide for “peace 
and defence” (Hobbes, 1994, 106-9).
The second justification addresses the issue of partiality. As Locke argues, one 
function of government is to serve as an impartial arbiter between individuals; 
for it is only when individuals relinquish the power to determine when they 
have been wronged and what the response should be that security can actually 
be attained (Locke, 1993, 324-5). Hume provides a similar justification when 
he states, “The same persons, who execute the laws of justice, will also decide 
all controversies concerning them; and being indifferent to the greatest part of 
the society, will decide them more equitably than every one wou’d in his own 
case” (Hume, 2006, 126). To the extent that government can impartially settle 
disputes, it can provide the same peace as Hobbes’ “awe inspiring” Leviathan. 
Either way, given the postulate of self-regard and conflict of interests, the 
justification of government is grounded upon a concern for security.
The Conflict over Resources
Conflict understood in terms of the conflict over resources involves what 
can be called the “postulate of scarcity.” The postulate of scarcity refers to 
the problems posed by limitations upon material resources. Given a disjuncture 
between human needs and the resources required to satisfy them, a condition 
of scarcity can be said to obtain. So understood, the postulate of scarcity has 
an integral place in modern political thought, as it signifies one of the main 
problems theorists endeavor to redress (Macpherson, 1979, 21-22; Schaefer, 
1983, 280f; Xenos, 1987, 2261). Because resources are scarce and human needs 
must be met, competition arises. As Hobbes puts it: “if any two men desire the 
same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; 
and in the way to their end.. .endeavour to destroy or subdue one another” 
(Hobbes, 1994, 75). Hume makes a similar point when he observes that the 
scarcity of possessions augments the problems that arise from “our selfishness.” 
(Hume, 2006, 89) It is, he observes, “the slender means” provided by nature to 
meet the “numberless wants and necessities” which drives individuals towards 
society; for within society individuals can coordinate their actions (Hume, 2006,
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87-88; Xenos, 1987, 227-228). If  individuals hesitate or refuse to form society 
under such conditions, then they can expect a perpetuation of the instability 
that that threatens their possessions.
Given the postulate of scarcity and the problems it poses political institutions 
assume two particular responsibilities. First, they assure individuals fair conditions 
of cooperation. According to Hume, such conditions are fostered by the 
establishment of rights, which ensure an individual’s “constant possession” of 
property' (Hume, 2006,91). Hobbes provides similar justification for government 
when he speaks about “propriety,” which is how he characterizes the situation in 
which “every man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he 
may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects.. (Hobbes, 1994, 
114). That is, the government provides a legitimate right to property which allows 
the individual to enjoy their possessions without fear o f interference from others 
(Hobbes, 1994,160-161). Conflict over resources is redressed by the government, 
then, to the extent that the government “securejs] every ones Property” (Locke, 
1993,353).
The second responsibility of government is to promote the fair allocation of 
resources. In this respect, Hobbes claims “the first law is for division of the land 
itself, wherein the sovereign assigneth to every man a portion, according as... 
he shall judge agreeable to equity and the common good” (Hobbes, 1994, 160). 
Similarly, the sovereign has the power to “appoint in what manner all kinds of 
contract between subjects...are to be made, and by what words and signs they 
shall be understood for valid,” which is to say, the government has the authority 
to establish laws governing the exchange of goods, market transactions, and 
rights o f inheritance (Hobbes, 1994, 163). The point is put differently by 
Hume and Locke, although goal remains the same: create the conditions for 
the fair allocation o f resources. For Hume, the issue is one o f collective action: 
how can the government prompt individuals to see beyond their own narrow 
interests, and coordinate their behavior for the common good? (Hume, 2006, 
126) For Locke, the fair allocation of resources is directed by the process of 
labor itself. Because individuals already possess a legitimate right to the goods 
they can appropriate and use, the government’s responsibility is to ensure that 
appropriation is allowed to proceed naturally -  according to the value added 
theory of labor — and little else. (Locke, 1993, 353, 412). The government, then, 
has a role to play in guaranteeing the fair allocation of resources, but primarily 
by refraining from allocating resources itself. Locke’s response to the postulate 
of scarcity thus differs from that of Hume, although both see the government
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as guaranteeing the conditions required for the fair allocation of resources. To 
the extent that this is so, both also understand government as helping overcome 
conflict grounded upon the postulate of scarcity.
Contemporary Interpretations and 'Responses
Despite the efforts of earlier theorists the dilemmas posed by the two concepts 
of conflict persist. Part of the reason the issues have proven so tenacious stems 
from particular methodological problems; the vision of the individual assumed 
by theorists such as Hobbes and Locke has been characterized as “atomistic” 
(Taylor, 1985). According to this line of criticism, previous theorists depend 
upon a simplistic account of human psychology. The contention is that the 
explanation of behavior utilized by early modern theorists treats individuals 
as passive regarding the formation of their interests, as individuals primarily 
respond to sensory experience. This “mechanistic” account of behavior is 
strongly contestable on both empirical and theoretical grounds, as contemporary 
scholars have become more sensitive to the significance of social context upon 
interest formation and the ethical consequences of “psychological egoism.” 
Suffice it to say that the initial responses to the two concepts of conflict have 
been found wanting, and this has prompted renewed attempts to overcome the 
challenges these concepts pose.
As regards contemporary responses, there has been a general tendency to 
reinterpret the assumptions underlying the two types of conflict and then 
address them in terms of preference satisfaction. Conflicts over resources, for 
example, are articulated in terms of the “circumstances of justice,” or what 
Rawls has defined as those “normal conditions under which human cooperation 
is both possible and necessary” (Rawls, 1971, 126). Because resources are now 
regarded as a part of the circumstances of justice the concept of the conflict 
over resources is redefined. As Rawls argues, the initial distribution of “primary 
goods” that everyone needs is not something anyone has any control over. 
Individuals find themselves born into a situation, and hence find their goals 
conditioned by circumstances beyond their initial control. To this extent, the 
allocation of resources — their scarcity or abundance — is to be understood 
in terms of a “natural lottery,” a concept that indicates how contingent 
circumstances provide the backdrop within which individuals live their lives 
(Rawls, 1971, 101-102). Consequently, the issue, when it is characterized in this 
way, is no longer one of competition so much as of cooperation. As Rawls 
puts it, given the morally arbitrary allocation of talents and goods, the main
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importance of basic institutions is their ability to “determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls, 1971, 58).
Just as the concept of the conflict over resources is reinterpreted, so the 
concept o f the conflict of interests is also recast. Whereas previously interests 
were defined in terms of a “natural temper” towards “selfishness,” contemporary 
theorists describe them in terms of preferences. As Gauthier explains it, 
preferences are to be understood as “interests of the self” rather than “interest 
in the self” (Gauthier, 1986, 7). This characterization of interests as preferences 
is more than definitional; it is meant to preempt the “atomistic” charge that 
individual interests exclude a concern for others. For “interests o f the self” 
are thought to allow for the possibility of cooperation in a way “interests in 
the self” do not, as the former idea does not assume that individuals are solely 
concerned only for themselves. We have interests we pursue, and these interests 
potentially converge with the interests of others. To the extent that this is so, 
there is potential for cooperation as individual interests are not automatically 
opposed to one another.
Given this conception of preferences the theoretical concern then revolves 
around the question of how are preferences to be satisfied. The satisfaction 
of preferences is generally stated in terms of “maximization.” The idea of 
maximization is a problematic one, but the general idea is that preferences are 
satisfied to the extent that they have been fully realized. Conflict potentially 
arises here in two ways. First, the maximization of one individual’s preference 
may preclude someone else’s ability to similarly maximize their own preference. 
Given the “circumstances of justice” it is presumably impossible for everyone 
to fulfill their preferences. Hence, who actually satisfies their preferences 
becomes a contentious issue. Second, it is not always clear how preferences are 
to be evaluated. Although there may be a shared belief that some preferences 
are more important than others, it is generally very difficult to specify the 
truly significant ones. The problem, here, is how to determine interpersonal 
comparisons which would allow individuals to determine which preferences 
are the most weighty. However, regardless of which of these problems arises, 
the restatement of interests as preferences turns upon one particular issue: the 
ranking of preferences.
The ranking of preferences depends upon several conditions, the first of which 
has been thought to involve distinguishing between two types of preferences: 
coherent” and “considered.” Coherent preferences are those preferences which 
are held in a consistent fashion. As Gauthier argues, there are two particular
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means of achieving coherent preferences: ordinal measures and interval measures 
(Gauthier, 1986, 39£). Ordinal measures involve a “weak” ranking of preferences, 
“from first to last, best to worst, most to least, with ties permitted,” and assumes 
both “completeness” (that individuals prefer one option over another, or are 
indifferent to both) and “transitivity” (that a more preferred option holds against any 
lesser preferred option) (Gauthier, 1986, 39). As Gauthier puts it: “Completeness 
and transitivity are together sufficient to ensure that the preference relationship 
weakly orders any set of possible outcomes” (Gauthier, 1986, 41). That said, 
ordinal measures do not indicate how strongly the preference is held. To determine 
the strength of the preference requires an interval measure, which determines 
not merely possible outcomes (as ordinal measures), but probable outcomes (or 
“lotteries”). In essence, interval measures assign probabilities to outcomes given 
conditions of uncertainty and risk when one is unsure of the actual likelihood of 
the outcome. Thus, individuals can be said to hold coherent preferences when 
they are able to rank their preferences (by way of ordinal measurements), as well 
as determine their significance by determining their probability of occurrence (by 
way of interval measurements).
Considered preferences are those which address both the “behavioral” and 
“attitudinal” dimensions of preference, as seen in choices and confirmed 
verbally. The importance of considered preferences is rather straightforward, 
for they embody the correspondence between behavior and attitude which 
allows for the calculation of preferences. Such calculations have taken the 
form of “maximin” reasoning, as with Rawls, or “minimax” reasoning, as in 
the case of Gauthier. The thing to note about these arguments is that both 
“maximin” and “minimax” arguments assume that once preferences have 
been assessed determinate rankings of values and goods can be provided, as 
regards social interaction. That is, once individuals can determinately assess their 
preferences, then, through a process of instrumental calculation, they can 
engage the preferences of others. For Rawls, the calculation involves attempting 
to maximize one’s most favorable “worst case scenario,” while for Gauthier the 
calculation involves minimizing one’s maximum level of concessions (Rawls, 
1971, 143; Gauthier, 1986, 137). Either way, the determination of preferences 
as outlined above is said to allow for the redress of conflict between preferences 
given the circumstances of justice.
The ability to rank preferences generates three basic arguments as regards 
political institutions. The first argument concerns the determination of rights, 
and involves the specification of fundamental liberties. This is most clearly seen
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with Rawls’ discussion of the lexical ordering of the two principles of justice, 
where the maximin rule determines the priority of basic rights and freedoms. 
As Rawls argues, given certain restrictions of information (described in terms 
o f the “veil of ignorance”), individuals would rank liberties according to those 
which “widen their opportunities, and enlarge their means for promoting their 
aim s...” (Rawls, 1971, 143). Put differently, under conditions of uncertainty, 
where no one knows the exact outcome of their decision, an individual’s 
considered preference will be to play it safe. The lexical ordering of the principles 
of justice thus provides an ordinal measure of liberties, but one grounded upon 
considerations stemming from the considered preferences of individuals in an 
extreme condition of uncertainty (Rawls, 1971,175). In this instance, the ability 
to rank preferences entails the ability to similarly rank basic rights, and thereby 
provides substantive moral content to a society’s political structure.
The second argument generated by preference orderings concerns the 
conditions of cooperation. For Rawls, these conditions are provided by the 
principles of justice, which are, again, lexically ordered. This ordering of the 
principles provides a framework that resolves disputes, and also provides 
a compass for appropriate political judgments (Rawls, 1971, 195f.). The 
goal is to encourage a “sense of justice” which grounds social stability, and 
dilutes individual proclivities to injustice, or the pursuit of personal interests 
at the expense of others (Rawls, 1971, 4-6, 454£). Similarly, for Gauthier the 
application of the minimax rule to “co-operative interaction... [and] constitutes 
a constraint on the direct pursuit of individual utility” (Gauthier, 1986, 145). By 
minimizing one’s maximum relative concession one refrains from engaging in 
those actions which exploit others and eventually render cooperation impossible 
(Gauthier, 1986,195). Thus, to ensure that one avoids being “compliant victim” 
political institutions are necessary, as they guarantee the rights which ensure the 
fair terms of cooperation, as well as sanction those who would take advantage 
of others (Gauthier, 1986, 258-267, 345-355). Ultimately, individuals agree to 
abide by a “proviso” which constrains their behavior and thereby facilitates 
mutually advantageous interaction (Gauthier, 1986, 200-217). Gauthier’s point 
is fundamentally the same as Rawls: having determined the order of preferences 
allows one to specify the conditions of fair cooperation.
The final argument concerns the allocation of resources. The idea is that 
ranking preferences allows for the proper distribution o f goods within society. 
Rawls draws attention to this consequence of his lexical ordering of principles 
when he says: “The serial ordering of principles expresses an underlying
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preference among primary social goods” (Rawls, 1971, 63). This “underlying 
preference” involves arranging the two principles of justice so that “basic 
liberties” are secured for all citizens, while the “distribution of income and 
wealth” is to the advantage of all, even if this allows for a certain amount of 
economic inequality (Rawls, 1971, 61-62). The point, for Rawls, is to assure 
fundamental rights, without allowing these rights to be used to justify the 
exploitation of others. The actual distribution of “income and wealth” can 
differ between societies — be based upon market mechanisms or directed by state 
institutions -  but no one’s basic liberties are to be infringed by this distribution. 
Consequently, resources and goods are properly distributed to the extent that 
they conform to the lexical ordering of the principles of justice (Rawls, 1971, 
265£). This argument is similar to one made by Gauthier, who wants to ensure 
“not only that no individual actually benefits at the expense of another, but 
also that no individual benefits differentially from the particular social structure 
selected” (Gauthier, 1986, 263). Principles have to be selected which “provide 
that each person’s expected share of the fruits of social interaction be related... 
to the contribution he would make in that social structure most favourable... 
to the fulfillment of his preferences...” (Gauthier, 1986, 264). Given that 
these preferences have already been settled according to the stipulations of the 
minimax rule, it is no surprise to find that the “principles of social interaction... 
are the same principles of rational agreement that underlie co-operation” 
(Gauthier, 1986, 265). Like Rawls, then, Gauthier argues that the distribution 
of goods and resources is fair to the extent that it conforms to the ranking of 
preferences, as determined by the minimax rule. Consequently, the arguments 
of both Rawls and Gauthier indicate how ordered preferences justify the 
distribution of resources, as ordered preferences underlie the political principles 
that regulate the allocation of goods.
Moral Pluralism  and the Conflict of Values
Moral pluralism can be defined in terms of the heterogeneity of values, and 
the variety of ways values can be organized or arranged (what can be called 
“moral constellations”). Values themselves can have an intrinsic or instrumental 
worth: they can be ends in themselves or means to another end. For example, 
liberty is something desirable in itself, but also something desirable because it 
provides a means to other goals (Taylor, 1985, 199; Raz, 1986, 6-14; Nozick, 
1974,49£). Often the significance of a value comes from its place within a moral 
constellation, which may assign a value instrumental or intrinsic importance.
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Liberty, for instance, is regarded as intrinsically important for liberalism, but 
only instrumentally important for utilitarianism. The significance of liberty, 
in these instances, is determined by its place within the particular moral 
constellation: there is a “presumption for liberty” with liberalism but not for 
utilitarianism, which is more concerned with the calculation of pleasure or well­
being (Raz, 1986, 8f.). In each case there is an architectonic moral vision which 
expresses certain value commitments (to liberty or to pleasure/well-being), and 
which grounds our commitments. However, despite the significance a moral 
constellation imparts to a value, values can independently exhibit intrinsic or 
instrumental significance. Honesty, for instance, can be the “best policy” because 
of the consequences of being truthful, or it can simply be the “right thing to 
do.” In this case, the relevance of the value comes not from its situation within a 
given moral constellation but from other considerations. Moral pluralism, then, 
can be said to involve two distinct concerns: the diversity of values themselves, 
and the diversity of moral constellations.
Incommensurability and Incompatibility
O f the many ideas frequently associated with moral pluralism, the two most 
important are the concepts of incommensurability and incompatibility. The 
standard characterization of incommensurability involves what is called the 
“Trichotomy Thesis,” which holds that two positions are incommensurable if 
neither can be regarded as better than the other nor can they be considered equal. 
The elaboration of the thesis is that “the trichotomy o f relations better than, 
worse than, and equally good” exhausts the possible relations between two or more 
objects (Chang, 1997, 4; Griffen, 1997, 35; Raz, 1986, 322; Seung and Bonevac, 
1992, 799). If nothing positive can be said about two or more objects in regards 
to these three relations, then the objects can be considered incommensurable. 
As Raz explains it, we can imagine a situation where A is better than B, but not 
better than C. However, B is better than C. In such situations, there is a failure 
o f transitivity, as neither A, B, nor C definitively trump the other. A’s superiority 
to B does not carry over to its relationship with C, nor does C’s superiority to A 
translate to its being better than B. This failure of transitivity is taken to be the 
“mark of incommensurability” which exemplifies the Trichotomy Thesis.
Incommensurability is frequently said to entail complete incomparability, as 
the lack of a common measure is thought to lead to an absolute inability to 
compare objects rationally (Raz, 1997, 124f.). Such a claim has been rejected 
by others, who argue that points of comparison -  “covering values” or “value
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measures” — can be stipulated in absence of a “slide-rule” type of standard 
(Anderson, 1992; Chang, 1997; Seung and Bonevac, 1992). Taylor elaborates the 
issue further by considering how individuals “articulate” goods for comparative 
purposes. According to Taylor, articulation is a process of practical reason that 
specifies points of identification between “different life goods” so that we can 
“judge them as more or less important” (Taylor, 1997,178-179). The importance 
of Taylor’s point is that it indicates a conceptual difference between the idea of 
incommensurability and the idea of incomparability, and that one can make 
comparative evaluations even in the absence of a metric. Thus, for present 
purposes, incommensurability will refer to the lack of a common measure, 
as well as the failures of comparison that result. Such incomparability is not 
comprehensive, as Raz suggest, although it remains conceptually significant.
Where the idea of incommensurability addresses the problems of comparison 
that arise according to the Trichotomy Thesis, the idea of incompatibility 
addresses issues of “exclusivity” and “opposition.” The basic thought is that 
given two or more values, the achievement of one may entail the loss, or 
sacrifice, of the other. According to Nagel, the exclusivity of values is “the 
impossibility in principle of realizing one value while realizing the other, or 
without frustrating the other” (Nagel, 2001,106). In other words, the exclusivity 
of values is a situation wherein individuals (or societies) are confronted with two 
values or goods, but can only attempt to attain one of them, the other being 
necessarily barred from pursuit. As Nagel explains it: “One can’t lead both a 
rural and an urban life, or a life of hard physical exertion and of intellectual 
contemplation” (Nagel, 2001). The decision to follow one sort o f life, or aspire 
to one set of values, necessarily excludes the ability to follow another type of 
fife, or another set of values. Again, in such instances, incompatibility arises as a 
form of exclusivity. Incompatibility as a form of value opposition arises when 
values are fundamentally opposed to one another. As Nagel characterizes it, 
value opposition arises “when each value actually condemns the other, rather 
than merely interfering with it” (Nagel, 2001, 106-107). An example of such 
opposition can be found with the values of liberty and equality. As Berlin notes:
If  a man is free to do anything he chooses, then the strong 
will crush the weak, the wolves will eat the sheep, and this 
puts an end to equality. If  perfect equality is to be attained 
then men must be prevented from outdistancing each other, 
wheter in material or in intellectual or in spiritual achievement, 
otherwise inequalities will result (Berlin, 2000, 22).
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Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlin” hypothetical clarifies Berlin’s claim, and illustrates 
the oppositional nature of liberty and equality. For as Nozick righdy notes, 
if individuals are allowed to dispose o f their possessions as they see fit then 
the pursuit o f equality is confounded (Nozick, 1974, 160£). In this instance, 
incompatibility takes the form of value opposition. Since both liberty' and 
equality are constituted in such a way as to not merely exclude one another, 
but also oppose one another, the two values compete. As Berlin make clear this 
competition assumes more than the “exclusive” form of incompatibility, where 
the pursuit of one value excludes the other. The competition, as Nozick indicates, 
is unavoidably oppositional. Consequently, the idea of incompatibility highlights 
more than the fact that values can be discrete. The idea o f incompatibility also 
brings to the fore the fact that some values can be diametrically opposed, and 
that such instances necessarily entail a rivalry of values.
M oral Conflict as a Third Concept o f  Conflict
The conflict associated with moral pluralism has a particular character as a 
result o f the ideas of incommensurability and incompatibility. Simply put, the 
idea of incompatibility serves as the source o f conflict between values, a conflict 
the idea of incommensurability renders difficult to resolve. There are two 
dimensions to this conflict, one as relates to the conflict of values themselves, 
the other which relates to the conflict of moral constellations. Presumably the 
two dimensions are linked together through the idea of incompatibility: because 
certain values are incompatible, the moral constellations associated with them 
can also be incompatible. However, regardless of whether the conflict involves 
values or constellations, issues of incommensurability become problematic. For 
failures of commensuration preclude the sort o f attempts to overcome conflict 
which are employed for the conflict of interests and conflict over resources. That 
is, the idea o f incommensurability precludes the type o f arguments concerning 
preferences contemporary theorists use to redress other concepts of con f l i r t  
Consequently, the concept of conflict associated with moral pluralism invites a 
reconsideration of how political institutions are justified.
As mentioned, the first dimension of conflict concerns the conflict of values. 
The conflict of values stems from the incompatibility of values. As Kekes 
explains it, “The incompatibility of values is partly due to qualities intrinsic to 
the conflicting values. Because o f these qualities, some values are so related 
as to make living according to one totally or proportionally exclude living 
according to the other” (Kekes, 1993, 54). Berlin provides another example of
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the incompatibility of values when he says: “a world of perfect justice...is not 
compatible with perfect mercy.. .either the law takes its toll, or men forgive...” 
(Berlin, 2000, 22). The incompatibility of values can be seen in debates in the 
United States about school busing. Parents who are against busing typically 
justify themselves in terms of the value of liberty, in this case the liberty to 
educate their children in schools of their choice (usually neighborhood or 
private schools). Similarly, proponents of busing argue in terms of equality, the 
argument being that the education system perpetuates disparities of wealth and 
privilege, primarily by insulating upper class neighborhoods (and schools) from 
the poor. The exclusivity and oppositional nature of the positions is evident, 
something that highlights the normative dimension of the controversy. In turn, 
this normative dimension clarifies the intransigent and persistent nature of the 
debates. Because the values at stake are oppositional, the hope for resolving these 
issues to the satisfaction of all involved is remote, as only one of the two values 
can be realized. And because the disputants appear to recognize this at some 
level, their interaction is frequently unyielding. Regardless, the significant point is 
that the incompatibility of values fuels a type of conflict that turns upon notions 
of exclusivity and opposition, and this conflict is not without political import.
Given that moral constellations are the arrangement of values, the conflict 
that results from the incompatibility of values has an impact upon moral 
constellations as well. An easy way to grasp the effect of the incompatibility of 
values upon moral constellations is to refer to the Cold War conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, a conflict whose normative dimension was 
ideologically expressed in terms of liberalism and Marxism. Liberalism, with its 
commitment to liberty as defined in terms of individual rights, is theoretically 
incompatible with Marxism, whose commitment to equality is defined in terms 
of a communist economic system. The ultimate expression of this fundamental 
incompatibility was a political, economic, and military rivalry that dominated the 
latter half o f the twentieth century, and in several instances threatened to boil 
over into outright hostility.1 More recently, similar incompatibilities of values
1 O f course it is possible to argue that the Soviet Union was not truly Marxist, and thus that the Cold 
War did not actually involve a confrontation between liberalism and Marxism. However, I do not 
believe such a view would affect my claim that incompatible values can generate a distinct form 
of conflict, and that the Cold War is a useful example of such conflict. For even if one concedes 
that the USSR was not genuinely Marxist, it is still the case that the opposition between the Soviet 
Union and the United States involved a contest of values that cannot be completely explained in 
terms of military strategy or economics. One might try to specify Soviet values in more conven­
tional “Russian” terms of some sort, by showing how the Soviet Union utilized traditional language 
and customs for its own ends (as the historian Richard Pipes does in much of his own research), 
but die oppositional and incompatibilities with the West would still be evident.
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can be found with moral constellations that take a religious form, especially 
those that relate to fundamentalism. Here the incompatibilities revolve 
around central claims of dogma, such as the messianic claims of Christianity 
concerning Jesus, which are disputed by Judaism or Islam. From the perspective 
of moral pluralism, it is doubtful that the three great monotheistic traditions 
can ever be fully reconciled. The reason why is straightforward: to be a Christian 
means affirming that Jesus was the messiah, a claim neither Judaism nor Islam 
countenance. No matter what overlap may exist as regards their ethical teachings, 
the core claim of Christianity excludes and opposes the core beliefs of Judaism 
(which holds the messiah has yet to appear) and Islam (which denies any claims 
concerning the incarnation of God). In this instance, the incompatibility of 
values potentially entails a result similar to what was experienced during the 
Cold War: an intractable conflict between moral constellations, whose source 
lies in the exclusive and oppositional nature of the values the constellations are 
grounded upon. The incompatibility of values thus yields an incompatibility of 
substantive moral positions.
In light of the problems the incompatibility of values pose, the question 
then becomes how to address moral conflict. That is, what can be done in 
response to the conflict of values? Nothing in the discussion so far precludes 
a reinterpretation of these issues in terms of preferences, which, as seen, is a 
maneuver contemporary theorists use to explain the concepts of the conflict 
of interest and the conflict over resources. It is equally plausible to interpret 
values in terms of preferences, and the conflict of values as a conflict of 
preferences, as was done with the conflict of interests. Such an approach 
would consider values subjectively, as evaluative statements expressing 
approval or disapproval. This, in turn, would allow value conflict to be treated 
as a problem of preferences, which means that values, as preferences, could 
be ranked and ordered according to the arguments provided previously, which 
is to say, in terms of coherent and considered preferences, whose articulation 
is to be understood in terms of ordinal and interval measurements. Such has, 
in fact, been argued by Gauthier, and is an argument that needs consideration 
(Gauthier, 1986, 46-59). For if Gauthier is correct, and values can be re­
described in terms of preferences, then there is no need to articulate a third 
conception of conflict. Suffice it to say, 1 do not think this is the case. For the 
idea of incommensurability indicates the limitations of a preference-based 
approach to moral conflict, and thereby justifies treating values as distinct 
from preferences.
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As noted previously, arguments concerning preferences involve attempts to 
order preferences. Preferences require measurement of some sort to determine 
their significance and rank them accordingly. The standard arguments concern 
the use of ordinal and interval measurements, which allow for the determination 
of coherent preferences. To boil these arguments down to their constituent 
elements: coherent preferences involve the ability to rank preferences according 
to ordinal and interval measures, of which ordinal measures are primary. To 
specify the limitations of a preference-based approach, then, requires specifying 
how incommensurability ultimately confounds the determination of coherent 
preferences by calling into question the ability to rank preferences ordinally.
The way in which incommensurability confounds the determination of coherent 
preferences stems from the Trichotomy Thesis. As noted, the Trichotomy Thesis 
holds that the relations better than, worse than, and equally good exhaust the possible 
relations between two or more objects. If nothing positive can be said about two or 
more objects in regards to these three relations, then the objects can be considered 
incommensurable. Another way of phrasing this is to say that the objects — in this 
case, values or moral constellations — are “on a par,” or exhibit “parity,” Parity is 
said to obtain when objects are “roughly equal,” or when no one of them can be 
specified as being absolutely or unequivocally better than another. They are, as 
Griffin puts it, “all in the same league, as it were” (Griffin, 1997, 38). The thought 
is that in some instances one object can be judged as being better than another, 
but in other instances the reverse is true.
The complication parity poses ordinal measurements is that objects which 
are on a par cannot be unconditionally characterized as “the best,” or “first,” 
or “greatest.” Although the sources of parity vary, the basic idea is that values 
differ in significance according to the specific context. Hence, there is no 
way to claim one value should always trump another, as what may hold true 
in one context might not be valid in different one. Paradigmatic instances of 
such parity can be found with civil rights cases: the equal treatment of African 
Americans, for example, trumps the liberty of restaurant owners to segregate 
their clientele. However, liberty trumps equality if affirmative action initiatives 
are proven to entail reverse discrimination. As these brief (and overly simplified) 
examples indicate, the claim that one value always “wins” is incorrect and the 
point should be clear: if the significance of values is always contextual, then the 
completeness requirement of ordinal measurements is rendered moot. For the 
idea of parity preempts the attainment of a “complete” ranking of preferences. 
This, in turn, carries consequences for transitivity. For if completeness cannot
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be attained then the requirement for transitivity likewise falls, as there is no 
established ranking which holds “down the line.” To be clear, parity does not 
exclude instances where one value (or constellation) trumps another. There can 
be compelling reasons which lead one value to be more significant than another. 
But parity does preclude die conclusion that such instances are definitive of 
those values (or constellations) in every other situation.
To summarize: if the Trichotomy Thesis is true, then the determination of 
coherent preferences is impossible. For the idea of parity that follows in the 
wake of the Trichotomy Thesis undermines the ability to establish the ordinal 
measurements necessary for the achievement o/coherent preferences. Parity, as the 
result of the Trichotomy Thesis, undercuts the ability to satisfy the completeness 
and transitivity requirements of ordinal measurements, which means, in turn, 
that coherent preferences are indeterminable. The idea of incommensurability, 
then, confounds the attempt to interpret values as preferences, by challenging the 
conception of measurement associated with the ranking o f preferences. If  this 
challenge stands, then moral pluralism and the conflict o f values that it invokes 
cannot be redressed through the preference-based arguments applied to other 
concepts of conflict.
Implications of Moral Pluralism and Value Conflict
If  the incompatibility of values leads to conflict, while incommensurability 
entails the inability to definitely rank values, then particular consequences 
surely follow. O f these, I will consider two briefly, one o f which concerns the 
tractability o f conflict, the other of which concerns debates about deliberative 
democracy. As should by now be evident, moral pluralism yields a slightly 
different take on conflict, which means that it should similarly yield different 
implications concerning political institutions. Politically speaking, one of the 
most significant consequences stemming from moral pluralism is the idea that 
conflict is intractable, hence, “eternal.” This point has been forcefully made 
by Berlin, when he said: “That we cannot have everything is a necessary, not 
a contingent, truth” (Berlin, 2002, 215). Berlin’s basic point is that the conflict 
of values is a constitutive part of the human condition. We cannot imagine, 
Berlin indicates, a situation in which we are not faced with the conflict of 
values. Rather, we can only imagine such a situation, which is more the result 
o f a longing for harmony and order than of a considered reflection about our 
factual circumstances. For when we consider the circumstances of our concrete, 
empirical, existence, we have to “recognise the fact that human goals are many,
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not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another” 
(Berlin, 2002, 216). As Berlin notes, the conflict of values is an observable, 
verifiable, truth. However, as he also indicates, the conflict of values is not 
simply the result of contingent circumstances or historical accident. Instead, 
the conflict that adheres to moral pluralism is a consequence of the nature of 
values themselves. Because some individual values are incompatible -  because 
certain values are by their nature oppositional and exclusive — the conflict 
between them is ineradicable. The tension between certain values is a result 
o f what those values are — how they are defined, what they stand for, and the 
ends they lead to. Consequently, so long as we acknowledge the merit o f those 
values -  of either their intrinsic or instrumental worth -  then there will be 
potential conflict between them. Again, as Berlin puts it, the incompatibility and 
incommensurability of some values is “not merely empirically but conceptually 
true” (Berlin, 2000, 23). If the incompatibility of some values is “conceptually 
true,” then value conflict is intractable, an enduring element of the human — 
hence political -  condition. The issue is not a sociological one concerning the 
diversity of human experience; it is not a statement about a “fact of pluralism.” 
Rather, the issue concerns the logical relations between values and moral 
constellations such that the exclusivity of values leads to conflict.
The degree to which the incompatibility and intractability of values presents 
a problem can also be seen with the challenge value conflict poses deliberative 
democracy, a normative theory of collective decision-making that highlights 
consensus as a condition of political legitimacy (Cohen, 1997, 407). Regarding 
the issue of moral pluralism, proponents of deliberative democracy tend to 
focus on the possibility of consensus: to what extent is consensus possible 
given the condition of moral pluralism? Deliberative democrats note that moral 
pluralism can lead to conflict, but how this conflict is addressed depends upon 
how pluralism is conceptualized. Deliberative theorists generally rely upon an 
interpretation of pluralism that highlights discursive elements that are amenable 
to deliberative goals. Such a take on moral pluralism is found in the later work of 
Rawls, for example, when he specifically addresses the question of stability within 
a democratic society.2 As he notes in Political Liberalism, concerns about stability 
arise in the face of a diversity of “comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls, 1993, 4).
2 Although some might want to dispute the characterization o f Rawls as being a “deliberative democrat” 
in light o f  his commitment to liberalism (the idea being that deliberative democracy is not the same 
thing as liberal democracy), there is a distinct and undeniable deliberative turn in Rawls’ later work. 
Thus, I think it is fair to look at his arguments in tandem with those theorists who are more directly 
known as proponents o f  deliberative democracy.
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According to Rawls, the issue is not merely the plurality of such doctrines but 
those features that render them compatible with a democratic order. As he 
says, “a democratic society is marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls, 
1993, 36, emphasis added). Such a statement is meant to draw attention to those 
aspects of pluralism that require arguments to be stated in “terms each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse...” (Rawls, 1993, 218). Similar 
characterizations of moral pluralism are also evident in the work of Habermas, 
Cohen, and Gutmann and Thompson, each of whom highlight those aspects of 
pluralism that are susceptible to reasoned discourse (Habermas, 1996,18; Cohen, 
1997, 76-77; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 14).
The idea that pluralism is defined in terms of its discursive features is central to 
the deliberative project. For the discursive features of pluralism are supposed to 
be amenable to deliberative engagement, and potentially allow actors to achieve 
the mutual understanding necessary for consensus. For Rawls, these features 
are subject to a concept of “public reason,” where “citizens’ reasoning...is 
now best guided by a political conception the principles and values of which all 
citizens can endorse” (Rawls, 1993, 10). Similarly, for Habermas these features 
are “unavoidable idealizations” that “transcend” communication, and provide 
the means to structure discourse (Habermas, 1996, 4£). The thing to note is that 
deliberative theorists require arguments to involve “reasons all can accept,” or be 
couched in terms that others can affirm (Bohman and Richardson, 2009; compare 
Rawls, 1993,137, 227, 241; and Habermas, 1996, 166). This qualifier is especially 
important for it clarifies the forms of interaction deliberative theorists hold will 
unfold between actors. Here a distinction is drawn between issues of consensus 
and bargaining, with consensus being regarded as the ideal outcome to achieve.
Two types of consensus can be distinguished within discussions of deliberative 
democracy. For the first, individuals converge on consensus for the same set 
of reasons. As Habermas characterizes this form of consensus: “only those 
reasons count that all participating parties together find acceptable” (Habermas, 
1996,119, compare Gutmann and Thompson, 1996,14, 55-57). For the second, 
individuals converge on consensus for reasons that reflect their own personal 
perspectives, irrespective of the reasons held by others. Rawls characterizes this 
type of convergence as an “overlapping consensus,” where “citizens may within 
their comprehensive doctrines regard the political conception of justice as true, 
or as reasonable, whatever their view allows” (Rawls, 1993, 151).3 No matter
’ Compare: “Now to state the main point: in the overlapping consensus... the acceptance o f the political 
conception is not a compromise between those holding different views, but rests on the totality of 
reasons specified within the comprehensive doctrine affirmed by each citizens” (Rawls, 1993:170-171).
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which form it takes, this “convergence thesis” is important for the deliberative 
approach, as it indicates the compatibility of values that consensus is taken 
to instantiate. At some level — either deeply personal or broadly political — 
divergent values are assumed to be reconcilable in a substantive way. As Rawls 
characterizes it, there is a “concordant fit” between different types of values 
such that consensus is feasible (Rawls, 1993, 171). However, when values are 
not so reconcilable and consensus is unlikely, then bargaining becomes the 
suggested alternative. Here the reconciliation of values requires that moral 
considerations be bracketed so actors can more easily forge an agreement. The 
assumption is that where consensus is impossible bargaining is supposed to 
allow for the possibility of agreement upon other grounds. And as Gutmann 
and Thompson make clear, even within the context of bargaining discursive 
considerations apply, as the ideal of reciprocity — or the obligation to provide 
reasons others can come to share -  places limits upon the arguments actors 
utilize. For in this case although the outcome of deliberation is something 
other than consensus the ideal o f mutual understanding retains its importance 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996,12, 7If.). The hope, then, is that some sort of 
convergence is possible, even if it is not the concordant fit o f consensus.
As should be obvious, the type of moral pluralism deliberative theorists 
conceptualize is one wherein value conflict is tempered. Rawls, for example, 
distinguishes between pluralism and reasonable pluralism, and intentionally refrains 
from talking about the former as it entails irrationality or “unreason” (Rawls, 
1993, 36-37, 65). Unfortunately he thereby gives the impression of avoiding the 
challenges moral pluralism truly poses, while steering the discussion in a direction 
that is favorable to the conclusions he desires. The same seems to be the case for 
other deliberative democrats (such as Habermas, and Gutmann and Thompson), 
who, as seen, also provide accounts of pluralism that are conditioned by their 
concerns about discourse. The issue is not how moral pluralism, defined in a very 
specific way, can yield outcomes amenable to deliberation. Rather the issue is how 
moral pluralism, uninfluenced by concerns about deliberation, actually relates to 
the pursuit of consensus and activity of bargaining.
When one does not define pluralism according to deliberative ideals, the 
implications of moral pluralism for consensus and bargaining are less benign than 
deliberative theorists hope. One of the problems relates to the link deliberative 
theorists posit between mutual understanding and consensus, the suggestion 
being that mutual understanding serves as the bridge to consensus. There are 
three potential complications here, one regarding the possibility of mutual
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understanding; the second regarding whether or not mutual understanding 
actually generates consensus; and the third regarding consensus itself. As 
regards the possibility of mutual understanding, there is a genuine concern 
that an individual’s own commitments pre-empt the ability to understand the 
claims another makes. The idea here is that moral constellations frame issues in 
such a way as to render alternative positions incomprehensible. As Barnes and 
Bloor argue, there is no “special core of concepts” that serves as a “bridgehead” 
between different moral views (Barnes and Bloor, 1982, 35-38). From this 
perspective, incommensurability entails mutual unintelligibility, as there is no 
“equivalence postulate” that facilitates translating one set of views or values into 
another (Barnes and Bloor, 1982, 22£). Instead, one’s views are determined by 
the values that one adheres to, to the point of excluding competing views from 
consideration. Without a common frame of reference there simply is no way to 
grasp the values of others.
Although Barnes and Bloor provide an extreme argument regarding 
the possibility of mutual understanding, it nevertheless remains the case 
that deliberative theorists tend to misconstrue the consequences of such 
understanding. A pluralist such as Berlin argues that insight into other positions 
is possible by way of imaginative insight, but also indicates that such insight does 
not render the incompatibility of values less troublesome (Berlin, 2000, 12). In 
fact, it may worsen the problem, as one more fully comprehends the sources 
o f the incompatibility. As noted previously, the relation between some values is 
exclusive, since the pursuit of one entails the exclusion or loss of another. When 
individuals recognize such incompatibility, the likelihood of consensus may be 
lessened as they strengthen their commitment to their own position. That is, 
given a situation of incompatible values, cognitive bolstering may be the result 
o f mutual understanding rather than consensus, as one reinforces one’s beliefs 
to sustain them rather than seek common ground with others. Here lies what I 
believe to be the real dilemma for deliberative democrats, as one can understand 
what others affirm, yet still reject their position while hardening one’s own. In 
other words, one can achieve mutual understanding without necessarily being 
led to pursue consensus. This underscores the second complication that moral 
pluralism poses for deliberative democrats: mutual understanding does not have 
the logical ties to consensus they suggest.
As regards the issue of consensus, if values are incompatible in the way pluralists 
hold, then consensus itself becomes an elusive ideal. For where values prove 
mutually exclusive the convergence thesis is more difficult to maintain. Either
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consensus is found along a much narrower range of values than deliberative 
theorists realize, or consensus is simply not possible. As a simple empirical 
matter, it is difficult to see how such convergence is feasible within the confines 
of the modern nation state. The sheer number of citizens renders it unlikely 
that consensus can be found according to “reasons all can accept” without those 
reasons being especially general. While general reasons can possibly ground 
some form of consensus, they are unlikely to generate more substantive reasons 
for acting (or for holding more developed moral commitments). Everyone may 
agree about the sanctity of life, for example, but deeply disagree about the death 
penalty or abortion. Consensus, in such instances, does not in itself generate the 
sort o f norms that resolve either of these controversies. For in these debates 
individuals on each side derive conclusions that are mutually exclusive from what 
are ostensibly shared assumptions. Both pro-choice and pro-life proponents 
claim to revere life (the mother or the unborn), while proponents and opponents 
of the death penalty do the same (victims and their families or the condemned). 
Yet what results is anything but a resolution of the matter. Consensus in such 
instances is too thin to settle the disagreement. This highlights the problem the 
deliberative approach faces: if mutual understanding does not necessarily entail 
consensus, and consensus itself cannot generate specific norms for conflict 
resolution, then pluralism poses a deeper challenge to deliberative democracy 
than thought.
Even the idea of an overlapping consensus, where individuals converge on 
the same values but for different reasons, seems of little help. For as Rawls’ 
discussion makes clear, overlapping consensus ultimately requires that certain 
types of reasons be excluded from consideration (Rawls, 1993, 152f.). This 
draws attention to my earlier point, that deliberative theorists conceptualize 
pluralism in a way that generates the conclusions they want. For the exclusion of 
reasons or arguments that are not conducive to consensus is meant to guarantee 
the desired outcome. What is wanted, however, is an argument about how 
to address those views (and the reasons which support them) that confound 
consensus. It does not seem that the idea of overlapping consensus adequately 
addresses the problem of value conflict, because it defines pluralism in such a 
way as to minimize, or even exclude, such conflict at the outset. For the reasons 
individuals have for adhering to the overlapping consensus can indeed vary; 
but they cannot vary so greatly as to undercut the possibility of consensus. 
Put differently, an overlapping consensus addresses the problem of the 
incompatibility of values by requiring that individuals hold values that ultimately
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cannot be incompatible. The reasons used to explicate one’s commitments 
cannot be such as to alienate others, a requirement that effectively precludes 
concerns about value incompatibility and intractability. However, as is obvious, 
such an approach is dissatisfying, as it seems to sidestep the problem.
Then there is the idea of bargaining. As noted, bargaining involves the 
attempt to forge an agreement in the absence of consensus. This, on the surface, 
suggests the possibility of addressing value conflict in a way that is sensitive 
to the problems mentioned. Where values are incompatible, some allowance 
must be made for the possibility that there might not be a final settlement 
of the issue. Gutmann and Thompson mention this in their own work on 
deliberative democracy, and I believe their observation is correct: where value 
conflict is potentially ongoing, any resolution must be regarded as impermanent 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996).4 The idea is that an issue can be reopened for 
further reconsideration as warranted, for in a situation where the exclusivity of 
values generates irresolvable issues the best way to proceed is to acknowledge 
this fact and allow for the possibility of revisiting the problems as necessary. 
However, there remains the problem of how to deal with value conflict through 
the actual activity of bargaining. If the approach is to deal with other forms of 
conflict as surrogates for value conflict, then the approach is open to objection. 
For, as argued earlier, attempts to substitute concepts such as preferences for 
values involve methodological problems that fail to capture how values relate. 
But if one can determine a means of dealing with values as values, and allow 
that the outcome will be conditional in the manner suggested, then one can 
address the issue in a way that does not involve the problems discussed thus far. 
I believe such an approach is suggested by Gray’s discussion of a modus vivendi, 
where compromise rather than consensus is the goal (Gray, 2010, 32). Here 
value conflict is governed by the realization that the problem is permanent, 
and cannot be overcome by insisting that all affirm the same ends. Rather, one 
acknowledges the partiality of one’s own position, and thereby acknowledges 
that one’s position is no more privileged than another’s. Instead of seeking 
an elusive consensus, one accepts the limitations given by the relation of the 
values themselves, and seeks an outcome that is less final than provisional. If
41 take this to be a distinct claim from the one Gutmann and Thompson make about the discursive 
dimensions o f  bargaining, which seems to me to contain the same errors that Rawls and Habermas 
make about deliberation and consensus. To suggest that value pluralism may entail provisional outcomes 
seems plausible given how I understand pluralism. To suggest that this outcome proceeds according 
to an ideal conceptualization o f  deliberation seems less so. Regardless, I think the two claims can 
be disentangled, and the more plausible one retained.
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bargaining is understood this way — as the pursuit of a modus vivendi arrangement 
— then I believe it offers a response to value conflict that is acceptable. If it is 
not — if bargaining is instead understood as a form of negotiation involving 
the re-description of values into other terms — then I believe it, too, will fail to 
provide an adequate response to value conflict.
That deliberative democracy faces serious challenges from the perspective 
of moral pluralism is clear, and potentially unsettling in a deep way. For while 
the direct challenge is to the deliberative ideal of consensus and the possibility 
of bargaining, a further challenge seems to arise for the ideal of democracy 
itself. Although it is well beyond the confines of the present study, a potential 
implication is that given the condition of moral pluralism democracy, as 
an institutional arrangement, is no more theoretically privileged than any 
other political practice. Typically the debates about deliberative democracy 
have addressed the question of what form of democracy is most suitable to 
a situation of moral pluralism. Critics of deliberative democracy have often 
proposed what has been termed an “agonistic” form of democracy, which 
stresses the contestatory nature of democratic institutions (e.g. Connolly, 2002; 
Mouffe, 2000; Mouffe and Laclau, 1985). While agonistic theorists take seriously 
the issue of value conflict, it nevertheless remains the case that moral pluralism 
raises a further, more significant question regarding the value of democracy 
itself. The assumption that democracy is the best means of managing conflict 
is especially problematic, for it is neither logically nor empirically true that value 
conflict can only be addressed -  or is even best addressed -  within the confines 
of democratic institutions. The issue here is similar to the one John Gray notes 
regarding the relations between moral pluralism and liberalism: if there are 
no logical ties between them, then the belief that one is the best response to 
the other remains contestable. In this case, the dilemma involves institutional 
arrangements rather than ideological commitment; for if there are no necessary 
ties between moral pluralism and democracy, then arguments that seek to 
redress value conflict through democratic means may be more tenuous than 
thought. I have indicated what these problems are in the case of deliberative 
democracy, but it is not difficult to see how these problems can be extended 
to the ideal and practice of democracy more generally. It may be that such 
concerns can generate novel arguments on behalf o f other institutions (such as 
the judiciary or bureaucracy), or that they highlight other considerations (such as 
historical circumstances) that explain the importance of democratic institutions. 
Nevertheless, the sort of problem faced by deliberative democrats -  that moral
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pluralism and value conflict may cut against their ideal -  is potentially a problem 
for all proponents of democracy, deliberative, agonistic, or otherwise. While I 
have no answer to this question at this precise moment, it may be enough to 
note this issue for now, as the basis for further study in the future.
C onclusion
As 1 have argued, the form o f conflict associated with moral pluralism is 
conceptually different from other visions of conflict, and this entails substantive 
consequences. Conflict understood in terms of the competition o f interests 
or over resources has been traditionally used to explain the advent of political 
institutions. As I argued, conflicts o f interest define conflict in terms of a postulate 
of self-regard, while conflicts over resources do so according to a postulate of 
scarcity. In their contemporary form these two conceptions of conflict have 
been interpreted in terms o f preferences, the idea being that reinterpreting 
interests as preferences and conditions of scarcity as “circumstances o f justice” 
allows for a better treatment o f the issues involved. O f these issues, how to 
rank preferences been the main concern of many contemporary theorists who 
interpret conflict in terms of preferences. Along these lines distinctions are 
made between types of preferences, with further discriminations being drawn 
as regards ways of measuring preferences. So far as contemporary arguments 
go, the assumption is that if preferences are properly measured then the conflict 
can be redressed. Consequently, the sort of conflicts traditionally defined in 
terms of interests and resources can be dealt with.
Next 1 argued that there is a third conception of conflict associated with moral 
pluralism. Moral pluralism -  defined in terms of the heterogeneity of values 
and moral constellations — raises issues concerning the incommensurability and 
incompatibility of values. Incompatibility highlights the exclusivity and oppositional 
nature of values, and specifies both the impossibility of pursuing all values as well 
as the intractable nature of value conflict. The idea of incommensurability, on the 
other hand, highlights the impossibility of measuring values as one might measure 
preferences. Because incommensurability' depends upon the Trichotomy Thesis, 
which, in turn, involves an idea of parity, attempts to use interval and ordinal 
measures to order values are confounded. Parity, which challenges the transitivity 
and completeness requirements of ordinal measures, prevents attempts to rank 
values as one might rank preferences. Thus, the sort of responses which are today 
used to redress the forms of conflict associated with interests and resources are 
inappropriate as regards the conflict of values.
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So far as politics goes, I argued that moral conflict necessitates a reconsideration 
of how institutions are justified. As I indicated, one of the consequences of the 
incompatibility and incommensurability of values is that the pursuit o f normative 
consensus is not a viable political goal. Because the conflict associated with moral 
pluralism is ultimately intractable, arguments that urge a normative consensus 
as the goal of politics are mistaken. At most one can hope for a modus vivendi 
arrangement, where there is an agreement about institutions grounded upon 
their ability to regulate conflict. Anything more — anything requiring, for instance, 
that individuals affirm the same moral commitments — is simply unwarrantable. 
If value conflict as I have sketched it out is correct, then die most that can be 
accomplished, politically, is to provide institutions which moderate value conflict, 
in the full realization that value conflict is a constituent part o f human experience. 
To wax poetic: if value conflict is true, then the general will is a romantic myth.
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